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Foreword 
 
This is one of several research reports written within the research 
program “The Value Creating Board”. The program is conducted at BI  
Norwegian School of Management and can be described by the 
following key words: boards, value creation, small and medium-sized 
firms, and actual board behavior. 
 
The research program contributes to increase our knowledge about 
corporate governance, but the focus of the research program is boards 
of directors. The value creating concept is also wider than just value 
creation for the shareowners. Our point of departure is that a firm has 
other objectives and obligations than just to serve the shareowners. 
Innovation, corporate social responsibility and long-termism are 
concepts being parts of our value creation understanding. In the 
research program we want to increase the knowledge of boards of 
directors, and within issues relating to boards we have focused on two 
separate, but overlapping topics. The first is boards in small and 
medium sized enterprises, including boards in family firms. The other 
is actual board behavior and behavioral perspectives on boards and 
governance.  
 
The research program is funded by the PULS program of the 
Norwegian Research Council together with Center for Cooperative 
Research at BI, DnB Invest (DnBNor), Innovation Norway, NHO-
Conferation of Norwegian Enterprise, Odin, Oslo Stock Exchange, 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers and Vital Insurance. The program has a core 
group of scholars affiliated with the Department of Innovation and 
Economic Organization at BI Norwegian School of Management, but 
we also have close ties with colleagues at other departments and other 
universities. Some of the research projects are conducted and 
published together with them. We have for example close cooperation 
about projects with colleagues in Sweden, in the Netherlands and in 
Italy. This report on family businesses leans on such cooperation and 
in particular from the input from Luca Gnan and Daniela Montemerlo 
from Bocconi University in Milan. 
 
Research reports, like this booklet, are one of several ways of 
publishing results from the research program. This and similar reports 
have mainly descriptive objectives. The purpose of these reports is to 
document the work that has been done, and the reports shall contribute 
to discussions and decisions about themes to be researched more in 
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detail. In addition to the research reports we also publish books and 
scientific articles. Some publications are directed towards students, 
executives and policy makers, while others are directed towards the 
international scholarly community. Within the frames of the research 
program two doctoral theses are now being written at BI Norwegian 
School of Management BI. 
 
This report is written by research assistant Lise Haalien, MSc under 
guidance by me as program director and coordinator. However, several 
others have also contributed to the report, including Cathrine Hansen, 
Jonas Gabrielsson, Jon Erland Lervik, Pingying Wenstøp, Jon Erik 
Svendsen and Elbjørg Gui Standal. Thanks also to Torill Eide and Tore 
Abrahamsen. 
 
This is the third research report that present results from collected 
survey data about Norwegian boards. The first report (written in 
Norwegian) was called “The innovation survey” (published in April 
2004) and is available on our websites (www.bi.no/boards). The 
second report (also written in Norwegian) was called “Description of 
Norwegian boards” (published in February 2005). It is also available 
on our websites as well as in a separate booklet. An English summary 
and an English explanation to the tables are included in the latter 
report. A fourth report from the research program has also been 
published (January 2005). The fourth report is not from the collected 
survey data, but based on one qualitative case study. Various 
publications from the research program are listed at the end of the 
present report. 
 
The present research report is about boards in family businesses. 
Family business governance is a theme we have found increasingly 
interesting and important. Family business research is thus a topic we 
have given increasing priority within the research program. We have 
therefore also got involved in various family business research net-
works as International Family Enterprise Research Academy (IFERA) 
and Family Business Network (FBN). We have also presented various 
scientific articles on family business governance at research 
conferences as the Academy of Management, European Group on 
Organisation Studies (EGOS) and European Academy of Management 
(EURAM). 
 
In this report we make comparisons across firm sizes, and between 
family businesses and other firms. A family business is not a clear 
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concept, and various family business definitions exist. We have thus 
also decided to show how our findings vary across various family 
business definitions. We decided to write this report in English as the 
previous reports have been written in Norwegian. We have needed a 
report that can help us communicate our descriptive findings to 
colleagues that do not read Norwegian. 
 
 
Morten Huse 
Director for the research program “The Value Creating Board” 
August 2005 
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1. Boards of directors in family businesses 
 
Corporate governance has through the last decades received 
considerable attention, but most of the attention has been given to 
boards and governance in large publicly held corporations. However, 
most firms are small and medium sized, have concentrated ownership 
and in most cases they can also be characterized as family businesses. 
This report is about boards in small and medium sized family 
businesses.  
 
This report is one of several research contributions, which are the 
outcomes of the research program ‘The Value Creating Board’ 
conducted at The Norwegian School of Management BI from 2003 to 
2007. The report responds to three main questions in research about 
governance in family business. 
1. What differentiate boards in family businesses from boards in 
other firms? 
2. How does firm size impact the role of boards in family 
businesses? 
3. How do core aspects of family businesses impact their boards 
of directors? 
 
The report is based on the data obtained in two major surveys, the 
“innovation survey” and the “small business survey”. The surveys 
were conducted in 2003/2004 and report findings from answers by 
CEO’s from 985 firms. This report first of all focuses on whether firm 
size has an impact on board behavior. A comparison between family 
and non-family businesses is made. Additionally, we explore the 
importance of clarity about family business definitions. We show how 
the descriptive statistics vary depending on the family business 
definitions that are used. This is an issue being discussed in the family 
business literature.  
 
1.1 Family businesses 
Family businesses are important to study because the majority of 
independent businesses are family owned, objectives in family 
businesses are likely to differ from non-family businesses, they are 
managed differently from non-family businesses, and developing 
governance systems in family businesses may have a large impact on 
society (Astrachan and Shanker, 2003; Corbetta and Montemerlo, 
1999). Family businesses range from small shops to large empires, and 
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core aspects of family business definitions include ownership, 
management, generation transfer, intentions to continue as a family 
business, family goals and interactions between the family and the 
business (Astrachan, Klein and Smyrnios, 2002).  
 
Sometimes a family has several businesses, and sometimes a business 
may have several family owners. Furthermore, there may be large 
families in small businesses, and small families in large businesses. In 
this report we concentrate on businesses regardless of family size. 
There are also examples where the owners of a business are within a 
family, but the most influential persons in the family are not direct 
owners of the business.  
 
Regardless of family business definition, in most countries most 
businesses may be defined as a family business (La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes and Schleifer, 1999; Westhead and Cowling, 1998). In the 
United States 80% of the businesses are run by families (Shanker and 
Astrachan, 1996).  
 
Neubauer and Lank (1998) argue that family businesses may enjoy 
competitive advantage due to a remaining entrepreneurial character 
and having a strong sense of responsibility to societies. Kets De Vries 
(1996) states that family members may gain business expertise during 
early childhood. This may also be a competitive advantage. Tagiuri 
and Davis (1982) state that family firms have a complex stakeholder 
structure that involves family members, top management and a board 
of directors. Family members are significant owners and play multiple 
roles in managing and governing the firm. 
 
1.2 Family business definitions 
There is no general agreement among academics when it comes to 
finding a common family business definition (Pieper, 2003). Reviews 
of definitions indicate that there is no clear separation between family 
and non-family businesses and that no single definition can capture the 
difference between the two types of entities (Astrachan, Klein and 
Smyrnios, 2002). One reason for this can be the wide scope of family 
businesses, and there is lack of consensus among scholars on which 
criteria that are most important when identifying a family business 
(Handler, 1989). However, some aspects of family involvement is a 
crucial point in defining a family business (Miller and Rice, 1967).  
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Villalonga and Amit (2004) show how main definitions of family 
businesses include different combinations of family ownership, family 
management and family control. Mustakallio (2002) categorizes the 
different definitions into six themes:  
1. Ownership (family owned) 
2. Management (family run) 
3. Generations (passed a generational transfer)  
4. Intention (the family’s intention to continue as a family 
business) 
5. Family goals (that may be broader than short term market 
prices) 
6. Interaction between the family and business 
 
Shanker and Astrachan (1996) argue that the criteria used to define 
family business should include:  
1. Voting control,  
2. Percentage of ownership (majority of ownership), 
3. Power over strategic direction (family in board),  
4. Involvement of multiple generations,  
5. Active management by family members (family in 
leadership).  
 
Perceptual definition. A much used definition is perceptual 
(Westhead and Cowling, 1998, Johannisson and Huse, 2000, 
Mustakallio, 2002). Do the main family actors perceive the business to 
be a family business? This is most often the membership criterion for 
inclusion in various family business networks. There are major 
variations across countries as to what main actors perceive to be a 
family business. In some countries there are more pride related to be a 
family business than in other countries. 
 
Family controlled or family owned businesses. Other much used 
definitions of a family business are based on control with ownership 
rights or voting rights (Neubauer and Lank, 1998), and about having 
the majority of ownership (Westhead and Cowling, 1998). The voting 
right definition is different from that of having the majority of 
ownership. These definitions include major variations in family and 
business constellations. The questions of voting control and majority 
of ownership also raises the question of one or more families, or even 
branches of families. It also raises questions of unequal voting rights. 
Most often family business definition includes that one or more 
families are in control or have the majority of ownership. 
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Family run businesses. Family run business definitions will 
consider family members in board or leadership positions (Schanker 
and Astrackan, 1996, Schulze et al, 2001). Board members will have 
the formal power over strategic direction. 
 
Generation is also an important concept in understanding family 
business. The generation concept has both with firm age, and with 
family intentions and family goals to do (Kets de Vries, 1996, Tagiuri 
and Davis, 1982, Neubauer and Lank, 1998). The generation 
approaches also show that in family businesses there may be 
difficulties in distinguishing between business roles and family roles. 
 
According to Westhead, Cowling and Storey (1997), the percentage of 
family business in one sample can differ between 15% and 81% when 
different definitions are applied. The objective with this report will be 
to analyze if and how the description of board composition and 
behavior vary across various family business definitions. 
 
1.3 Governance in family businesses 
The family has traditionally been the model of governance for private 
businesses (Gomez, 2005). Families were used for centuries to manage 
private estates, and in private businesses the power was in reality in the 
hands of the family man acting as bonus paterfamilias. Within the 
business they could act as they pleased as an owner, but also as a good 
father respecting laws and business rules. They are economically 
responsible for the business, and morally they are also responsible in 
relation to their families, their employees and their environment. The 
ownership assumptions found in a paternalistic logic are clearly 
different from those derived from agency theory (Johannisson and 
Huse, 2000). Present research based on agency theory describes 
faceless and heartless owners. In paternalism owners have faces and 
hearts (Aronoff and Ward, 2001).  
 
A main concern in family businesses is to balance the interests of the 
family and the business (Carlock and Ward, 2001). Business decisions 
are often found to be taken in the realm of the family and family values 
rather than in the realm of the business (Johannisson and Huse, 2000). 
In studies about governance in SMEs we hear anecdotes about how 
family matters when making decisions in the business. It is reported 
that board meetings take place almost every day, but around the 
kitchen table. Others report how family concerns for the business are 
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shared and discussed in family gatherings like a Christmas party. Both 
the in-kitchen discussions and the Christmas parties may be important 
governance mechanisms in many family businesses.  
 
Many family businesses have family councils as a governance 
mechanism. Family councils are generally studied and discussed as a 
family governance mechanism in large families and very large family 
businesses (Lansberg, 1999, Ward, 1991). Sometimes they may be 
formal and are voluntarily included and described in family 
constitutions. But family councils may also be informal governance 
mechanisms that operate in the intersection of family concerns, 
ownership concerns, governance concerns and managerial concerns. 
 
1.4 A description of boards in Norwegian family businesses 
Mainstream board and governance research has been strongly 
criticized (Daily, Dalton and Cannella, 2003). Most research on boards 
has used archival data from large U.S. corporations with dispersed 
ownership, and little attention has been given to board processes and 
actual board behavior. The focus in this report is boards in family 
businesses, and we have wanted to answer the criticisms of present 
“black-box” or input-output studies of boards (Daily et al, 2003, Zahra 
and Pearce, 1989). In this report we present survey data collected 
through questionnaires, most of the firms are small and have 
concentrated ownership. Most of the collected data reflects actual 
board behavior and board processes. We present a description of 
boards in Norwegian family businesses.  
 
Family business governance has received increased attention the last 
years academically, in the media and among family businesses. The 
reason for this may be that family businesses differ from general 
business governance, and research on effective governance of large 
public firms should not be directly translated to the family business 
context (Pieper, 2003, Gabrielsson and Huse, 2005).  
 
The theoretical background for this report and the research program is 
contingency theory combined with evolutionary perspectives. Contin-
gency theory implies that there is not one best way of governance, but 
not all ways are equally good. A design of boards and governance must 
consider the actors as well as the context. A main challenge in the 
research program has thus been to study actual board behavior (Forbes 
and Milliken, 1999, Pettigrew, 1992). Board and governance research 
has been criticized for having only limited practical or actionable 
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impact (Finkelstein and Mooney, 2003, Lawler et al, 2002). We hope 
to meet this criticism by focusing on actual board behavior. The 
theoretical framework is summarized in the following model. The 
model is described in more detailed in Huse (2005). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The model positions the observations we present in the report. The 
context is boards in small and medium sized Norwegian family 
businesses.  We will first present our observations about the CEO and 
the board members including the board chairperson (chapter 3 and 4). 
Important attributes are tenure, age, gender, experience, knowledge 
and motivation of the board members and the CEO. We also present 
various board composition measures like number of board members, 
independence, diversity, etc. In chapter 5 we present interactions inside 
and outside the boardroom. Influence, trust, role integration and board 
leadership are among the measures we will present. In chapter 6 we 
present the boards’ working style, including board structures and 
decision making, and the number and length of the board meetings, 
and in chapter 7 we present board task performance, including overall 
supervisory roles, service and control roles, and the boards involve-
ment in strategic decision making. 
 
Before presenting our observations about the boards we will in a 
separate methods chapter present the data collection and the samples. 
External 
stakeholders  
Internal 
stakeholders 
Context / 
resources  
Board 
members 
Ch 3+4 
Interactions 
Ch 5 
Structures  
Ch 6 
Decision making 
Ch 6
Board task 
performance 
Ch 7 
Value 
creation 
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2. Method 
 
The report is a descriptive presentation of data from the “Value 
Creating Board” program at the Norwegian School of Management BI. 
The data in this report is about boards in Norwegian family firms.  
 
The initial quantitative data in the value creating board program was 
collected through two surveys. These are the “innovation survey” and 
the “small business survey”. There were two main versions in each of 
the surveys. One was for the CEOs, and another version was sent to 
board chairpersons in firms where the CEO already had responded. 
The data collection took place during fall 2003 and winter 2004. 
 
2.1 The “innovation” and “small business” surveys 
This report is based on the data from the “innovation survey” and the 
“small business survey”. The tables illustrate the numbers that were 
most relevant in a family business context and the questions from the 
questionnaire that were applicable with the objective of this report.  
 
The “innovation survey” was sent to the three main samples. These 
were the largest Norwegian firms (762 large firms), a sample of firms 
with 30-50 employees (427 firms), and a sample of firms with 10-30 
employees (541 firms). The CEOs were the respondents of the 
questionnaires. The questionnaire contained about 200 questions. We 
called it the “innovation survey” as it also contained questions about 
corporate entrepreneurship and innovation. During the fall 2003 we 
received 249 responses with completed questionnaires from CEOs in 
the largest firms, 115 responses in the mid-size group, and 124 
responses from CEOs in the group with the smallest firms. The gross 
response rates were thus 33%, 27% and 23% for the three groups 
respectively. However, we made various findings when conducting 
non-respondent analyses. In the sample of the largest firms CEOs of 
subsidiaries had not responded in the cases where they belonged to 
business groups, the gross response rate was lower for firms with 
foreign ownership (26%), and the response rate from firms with public 
ownership was also low (33%). The gross response rate from firms 
being listed on Oslo Stock Exchange was 35%. In the samples of the 
small firms we found that many firms did not have real boards of 
directors, and many questionnaires were thus not returned in 
completed form. This was in particular the case with the smallest 
firms. 
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Various ex-post non-respondent studies were conducted. Together with 
the second reminder to the CEOs we also asked the CEOs why they 
did not respond. They received six response alternatives, and we 
received replies from 75 “non-responding” firms indicated the 
following main reasons: time constraints 25 responses, not relevant for 
the firm 19 responses, do not want to participate/no incentive to 
participate 10 responses, no opportunity/nobody available 7, no 
reasons 14 responses. The above mentioned gross response rates could 
also be adjusted for 53 questionnaires that were returned unopened due 
to wrong mailing address, etc. 
 
A total of 488 completed questionnaires were received from the CEOs 
in the “innovation survey”. However, we also sent an adjusted 
questionnaire containing most of the same questions to the board 
chairperson in 446 of these 488 firms. CEO duality existed in 42 cases. 
We received completed questionnaire from 186 board chairpersons 
(response rate 42%). The lowest response rates were from firms with 
foreign ownership, and the second lowest from the smallest firms.  
 
The “small business survey” was sent to random samples of firms 
that in our original database were registered with between 5 and 30 
employees. The questionnaire was similar to that in the “innovation 
survey”. However, some questions were adjusted to meet the situation 
of very small firms, some questions were added, and some questions 
were taken out, e.g. the corporate entrepreneurship questions. In the 
“small business survey” we first had a sample exploration phase. The 
questionnaire was sent to the CEOs of 3000 firms. After an 
introductory question about industry they were asked if overall 
questions about boards were relevant for their firm. We received 973 
responses after one reminder, and 471 out of them reported that the 
questions were not relevant for them. We received 498 completed 
questionnaires. The sample was divided into four quartiles with respect 
to firm size. There were no big differences with respect to responding 
across the different firm sizes, but the gross response rate for full 
questionnaires was lowest in the quartile with the smallest firms. It was 
largest in the quartile with the largest firms. 
 
In the “small business survey” we sent the questionnaire to the board 
chairperson in 332 of the 498 firms were we had received responses 
from the CEO. The main reason for exclusion was CEO duality. 
Completed questionnaires from 87 board chairpersons were received. 
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In total from the two main surveys we received completed 
questionnaires from 985 CEOs, and in 285 firms we had responses 
from both the CEO and the board chairperson. We will here only 
report descriptive figures about the board of directors, and in most 
cases only questions that have been asked in both survey. Furthermore, 
in this report we will only use information given by the CEOs. Lervik 
et al (2005) reports results where information also from the CEOs is 
included. 
 
2.2 Description of the sample 
In the previous chapter we presented various characteristics describing 
a family firm. In the surveys we asked questions resembling these 
characteristics. Among our 985 firms the following number of firms 
could be considered as family firms based on the various family 
business definitions:  
• 396 cases/40%  The CEO perceived it to be a family firm 
(B04) 
• 436 cases/44%  One or a few families had voting control 
(B05) 
• 463 cases/47%  One or a few families had majority ownership 
(B06) 
• 596 cases/61% Owner families are represented in the board 
(B07) 
• 473 cases/48% Owner families are represented in leadership 
(B08) 
• 211 cases/21% More generations from the owner family 
active in the firm (B09) 
 
Boards and corporate law in Norway 
In the presentation of the results we will generally use the perceived 
definition, but we will also on all questions report overall figures for 
each of the six definitions or questions above. 
 
When studying boards of directors we often find that there may be 
varying legal requirements to board composition that vary with respect 
to size. In Norway some of these requirements vary with respect to the 
number of employees. Joint stock companies in Norway must have a 
formal board of directors. The board of directors shall have a minimum 
of three members, the CEO is not allowed to be the board chairperson 
(CEO duality), and the board must delegate the daily operations of the 
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firm to a CEO. However, firms with a share capital less than 3 million 
Norwegian crowns (about 500,000 USD) do not need to have more 
than one board member, CEO duality is then also allowed, and 
delegation is not compulsory. This will often be the case in the very 
small firms even though they are registered as joint stock companies. 
 
In firms with more than 30 employees two thirds of the employees can 
demand that the employees shall be represented by at least one board 
member. In firms with more than 50 employees one half of the 
employees can demand that one third of the board member, or at least 
two persons, are elected by and among the employees. In boards with 
employee representation it is required that there must exist board 
instructions and CEO work descriptions. Firms with more than 200 
hundred employees are generally supposed to have a corporate 
assembly. The main argument for a corporate assembly is code-
termination. Employees and shareholders are electing representatives 
to the corporate assembly. The main tasks of the corporate assembly 
are to select board members and to discuss decisions that may be of 
major or long term importance for the firm. It is possible to get 
exception from having a corporate assembly. However, there will then 
be a requirement of having more employee elected board members or 
observers at the board meetings. 
 
In Norway various corporate forms exist. Firms having various 
corporate forms are included in the sample. There are some state 
enterprises, some foundations and some cooperatives among the 985 
firms. These will generally not be family firms. However, there are 
also two types of joint stock companies. One of the types is the firms 
that are publicly traded. There are about 600 Norwegian firms being 
publicly traded (called ASA-firms), and about one third of them are 
listed on Oslo Stock Exchange. These figures are continually changing. 
The ASA-firms are generally larger than the joint stock firms not being 
traded publicly. Most ASA-firms have more than 200 employees, but 
there are also firms not being publicly traded (AS-firms) with more 
than 200 employees. The large AS-firms are typically family firms, 
subsidiaries or state owned firms. 
 
In Norway a new law has been introduced about gender representation 
on corporate board. This law is in operation from 2005 and is only for 
ASA-firms. Our data were collected before this law became operative. 
This law requires at least 40% of the board members in ASA-firms 
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shall be of the least represented sex. Similar laws or rules already exist 
for state owned enterprises. 
 
Responses across firm sizes 
In table 1 the total number of responses across firm sizes is presented. 
The perceived definition of family firms (B04) is used to discriminate 
between family firms and other firms. 
 
Table 1 Responses and age across sizes (perceived family firm definition) 
Number of employees 0-
10 
11-
29 
30-
49 
50-
199 
200- Total 
Family 
firms 
 
161 115 38  52 26 392 Total number of 
responses 
Others firms 
 
 
163 175 42 88 86 554 
Age of firms 
(median) 
Family 
firms 
 
18 31 33 58 79  
 Others firms 
 
11 14 19 18 56  
 
The number across each firm size category is not representative for all 
Norwegian firms. Our sampling was not intended to be representative 
for that purpose. The group with less than ten employees is the most 
represented in the sample. Many of these firms do not have a share 
capital larger than 3 million Norwegian crowns. The category with 
between 10 and 30 employees is also big. We see from the table that 
the relative number of family firms is negatively related to firm size. 
 
The governance structure of firms in the 50-199 category may be 
atypical. This category falls in between the various ex-ante defined 
samples. They are either firms that originally belonged to the largest 
size firm category, or firms originally belonging to categories with less 
than 50 employees. 
 
The median age of the firms are also reported in table 1. The categories 
with family businesses have higher median ages than the respective 
category of other firms. 
 
2.3 Presentations and tables 
The purpose of the report is to present descriptive statistics about 
boards in Norwegian family firms. The report shall be used to 
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document what has been done and as an input to discussions about 
further and more detailed analyses. 
 
Attributes and characteristics of boards in Norwegian family 
businesses are presented in the five next chapters. These are about: 
• The CEO and the chairperson (chapter 3) 
• Board composition and attributes of board members (chapter 
4) 
• Interactions inside and outside the boardroom (chapter 5) 
• The board’s working style (chapter 6) 
• Board task performance (chapter 7) 
 
The main tables in the report are similar to table 1. Comparisons are 
made across firm size categories, and between family firms and other 
firms. The perceived definition (B04) is used. In each chapter we also 
include comparison of board measures across various family business 
definitions. The tables are commented, but not interpreted.  
 
Statistics 
Generally we report means. In the tables comparing various family 
business definitions we have also included the standard errors of the 
means. This makes it easier to evaluate the significance of the 
differences presented. Significance at a 5% two-tailed confidence level 
is found when the difference between the means is larger than the sum 
of the standard errors for the respective means. In all tables we have 
also included lines indicated the minimum number of respondents 
behind the responses of each question (Min N). 
 
We have also presented various frequency tables in an appendix. Some 
of the measures being presented in chapters 3 to 7 are summaries of 
various questions. An extended and almost a direct translation of the 
questions asked in the questionnaires are also presented in the 
frequency tables. It is indicated in a separate column in the tables in 
the main chapters which question(s) that the figures are based on.  
 
Likert-type scale and questions 
Most of the questions being asked in the survey questionnaires were 
Likert-type questions. In such questions the respondents are asked to 
rate from a scale as to how much they disagree or agree with presented 
assertions. The scales used in the questionnaires were from 1 to 5, 
where 1 was strongly disagree and 5 was strongly agree. It is indicated 
in the table if a Likert-type scale is used or if other measures are used. 
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3. The CEO and the chairperson 
 
The CEO and the chairperson are often considered to be the most 
important individual persons when describing and understanding 
corporate governance. We will here first present their roles in the 
board, and their tenure in the firm and the board. We will then present 
their age and gender, and the number of other board memberships held 
by the CEO. 
 
3.1 CEO and chairperson: Tenure and roles 
CEO duality is one of the most regarded issues in studies of boards of 
directors. CEO duality exists when the CEO also is the board 
chairperson. It is not allowed to have CEO duality in Norwegian joint 
stock companies with share capital larger than 3 million Norwegian 
crowns. Most codes of best corporate governance practices also 
recommend a separation of these role. These recommendations often 
also include that the CEO should not be a voting member of the board, 
and that the former CEO should not become the new chairperson. 
 
Tenure has been used in discussion of the relative power between 
CEOs and boards, and also about board roles. Generally we expect a 
relationship indicating the longer tenure, the more power.  A board 
chairperson having longer tenure than the CEO is expected to have 
more power than the CEO. This is particularly the case if the CEO is 
recently selected. This may also have implications for board roles as a 
chairperson is expected to mentor, protect and support a newly selected 
CEO. 
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Table 2 Tenure of the CEO and the chairperson - a comparison across firm 
sizes 
Number of 
employees 
  0-10 11-29 30-
49 
50-
199 
200- 
Min N Family 156 107 36 49 25  
 Other 157 170 41 84 84 
A2a Family 37% 29% 23% 17% 08% The CEO is also 
board chairperson 
(percentage) 
 Other 23% 14% 10% 02% 01% 
A2b Family 73% 66% 59% 54% 42% The CEO is a 
voting member of 
the board 
(percentage) 
 Other 66% 53% 43% 20% 15% 
Family 39% 22% 44% 37% 44%   The board chair is 
the former CEO 
of the firm 
(percentage) 
A3 
Other 74% 13% 12% 13% 14% 
Family 9.27 9.03 8.00 6.82 8.56 The tenure of 
chairperson as 
chair (years) 
A4 
Other 5.01 5.62 4.08 4.14 3.92 
Family 9.26 10.84 8.97 9.63 8.50 The tenure of 
CEO as CEO in 
firm (years) 
A5 
Other 6.43 7.41 7.61 .5.91 6.30 
Family 12.77 15.90 14.13 15.63 13.55 The tenure of 
CEO as firm 
employee (years) 
A6 
Other 8.49 9.80 11.11 8.33 9.45 
 
CEO duality more common in family firms 
Table 2 has a presentation of roles and tenure of CEOs and 
chairpersons. 
 
The CEO as board chair (CEO duality). CEO duality exists in about 
one third of the small family firms, but CEO duality decreases with 
firm size. In the largest family firms CEO duality exists in only 8% of 
the firms (two cases). CEO duality exists to a less degree in other 
firms. 
 
The CEO as board member. The CEO is board member in about one 
half of the family firms. CEO board membership in family firms 
decreases with firm size. The same is the case in other firms, but the 
figures are lower for all firm size categories.  
 
Board chair former CEO. This is generally more often the case in 
family business than in the other firms. An exception for the non-
family firms is found for the firms with less than 10 employees. About 
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40% of the board chairpersons in family firms have been the former 
CEO.  
 
Tenure of board chair. Board chair tenure is the number of years the 
board chair has served as board chair. In the family firms they have in 
average about 9 years of tenure in the position as chairperson. This is 
longer in the position as chairperson than in the other firms 
 
Tenure of CEO. In the table we find both the number of years as CEO 
and the number of years the CEO has been employed in the firm. The 
figures on the number of years as CEO are similar to those of the 
chairperson. The CEO has in general been one more year in position 
than the board chairs, and more than two more years than the CEOs in 
the other firms. Furthermore, the CEO’s has in average been employed 
14 years in the family business, which means four years employment 
prior to becoming CEO. The differences between the size groups are 
only minor. 
 
Split between ownership and generation definitions 
In table 3 we see that there are only minor differences in the chair and 
CEO tenure descriptions if we use alternative family business 
definitions. In table 3 we used the perceived family business definition.  
 
The main differences we find across definitions are how the generation 
definition differs from the other, and in particular from the majority 
ownership definition.  
 
 
 
 
24
Table 3 Tenure of the CEO and the chairperson  - a comparison across family 
business definitions  
 
Significant differences 
• CEO duality. Difference between family leadership definition 
on one side, and family ownership and family board 
definitions on the other side. CEO duality is the most common 
under the family in leadership definition. 
• CEO as board member. We find that there is a significant 
difference between the family in leadership and the other 
definitions. CEO as board member is most common under the 
family in leadership definition. 
• Tenure. The differences between the generation definition and 
majority of ownership definition are significant on all four 
tenure attributes. Tenure is highest under the generation 
definition. There are also some other significant differences, 
e.g. chairperson tenure and the CEO tenure in the family in 
board definition than in the perceived definition. The extreme 
definitions with respect to chair and CEO tenure are on the 
   Perceived 
V
oting  
control 
M
ajority 
ow
nership 
Fam
ily in 
board 
Fam
ily in 
leadership 
G
eneration 
Definitions   B04 B05 B06 B07 B08 B09 
A2a Mean 29% 29% 25% 27% 32% 29% The CEO is also 
board chairperson 
(percentage) 
 Std.err .02 .02 .02 .02 .02 .03 
A2b Mean 65% 65% 64% 65% 74% 66% The CEO is a voting 
member of the 
board (percentage) 
 Std.err .02 .02 .02 .02 .02 .03 
A3 Mean 43% 45% 39% 40%   40% 45%   The board chair is 
the former CEO of 
the firm 
(percentage) 
 Std.err .02 .02 .02  .02 .02 .04 
A4 Mean 8.69 8.37 8.06 7.76 8.15 10.14 The tenure of 
chairperson as chair 
(years) 
 Std.err .39 .37 .36  .31 .35 .61 
A5 Mean 9.74 9.08 8.71 8.94 10.11 10.46 The tenure of CEO 
as CEO in firm 
(years) 
 Std.err .42 .38 .36 .33 .38 .62 
A6 Mean 14.29 13.28 12.93 12.76 14.13 14.68 The tenure of CEO 
as firm employee 
(years) 
 Std.err .54 .49 .47 .41 .46 .74 
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high side in the generation definition, and on the low side in 
the family in the board and majority of ownership definition. 
 
3.2 CEO and the chairperson: Experience, age and gender  
The number of memberships in boards of other firms may be an 
indication of status, experience and knowledge. Such memberships 
may be helpful in interorganizational relations, and the number of 
board memberships may also be an indication of power. Board 
chairpersons are generally expected to be experienced men. They are 
often retired or well established CEOs of other companies. In family 
firms there are many observations about the board chairperson being 
the father, and that the son is the CEO. Another frequently found 
alternative is that the family lawyer also has the role of board 
chairperson. 
 
The importance of age 
The age of the board chairperson is one of the attributes distinguishing 
family firms from other firms. Number of board memberships, and the 
age and tenure of the chairpersons and the CEOs are presented in table 
4. 
 
Table 4 Age and gender of the CEO and the chairperson - a comparison 
across firm sizes 
 
 
Board membership in other firms. The table shows that board members 
in family firms have more external board memberships than board 
Number of 
employees 
  0-10 11-29 30-49 50-
199 
200- 
Min N Family 155 107 36 49 25 
  Other 157 170 41 84 84 
A7 Family 2.37 3.37 3.47 4.23 4.38 Number of board 
memberships held 
by the CEO 
 Other 1.95 1.62 2.64 4.11 4.64 
A8 Family 52.9 53.1 53.2 55.1 58.2 Age of the 
chairperson 
(years) 
 Other 49.1 51.0 52.6 51.0 53.6 
A9 Family 47.6 47.5 46.2 49.3 50.0 Age of the CEO 
(years)  Other 45.8 46.4 49.4 48.6 50.0 
A10 Family 92% 94% 100% 94% 100% Percentage men 
among the 
chairpersons 
 Other 91% 95% 90% 98% 99% 
A11 Family 85% 93% 95% 96% 100% Percentage of 
men among the 
CEOs 
 Other 83% 91% 90% 97% 99% 
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members in other firms. This is the case for all firm size categories, but 
for the largest. The number of other board memberships increases with 
firm size. 
 
Age of board chairperson and CEO. The chairpersons in family firms 
are in average older than chairpersons in the non-family firms. The age 
increases with the size of the firm. The CEOs in the smaller family 
firms are older than the CEOs in non-family firms. The age differences 
are leveling out as firm size is increasing. In the smallest family firms 
the CEOs are in average 5 years younger than the chairperson. In the 
largest family firms the age difference is in average more than 8 years. 
The age difference between the chairpersons and the CEO also 
increases with firm size. 
 
Gender. In both types of firms the gender of the chairpersons and the 
CEOs is male with very few exceptions. There are very few women as 
CEOs and chairpersons. In the largest firms they are almost non 
existing. There are no differences between family firms and other 
firms. 
 
Age of board chairperson and generation definition 
The age of the board chairperson is significantly higher when using a 
generation definition than when using other definitions. This is 
presented in table 5.  
 
Table 5 Age and gender among the CEO and the chairperson - a comparison 
across family business definitions 
   Perceived 
V
oting 
control 
M
ajority 
ow
nership 
Fam
ily in 
board 
Fam
ily in 
leadership 
G
eneration 
Definitions   B04 B05 B06 B07 B08 B09 
A7 Mean 3.17 3.06 3.08 2.98 2.67 2.84 Board memberships 
held by the CEO  Std.err .28 .25 .24 .20 .16 .40 
A8 Mean 53.6 53.0 52.9 52.6 52.7 55.6 Age of the board 
chairperson  Std.err .49 .48 .46 .40 .45 .66 
A9 Mean 47.8 48.0 47.4 47.6 47.6 48.5 Age of the CEO 
 Std.err .46 .43 .42 .37 .43 .69 
A10 Mean 94% 94% 94% 94% 95% 92% Percentage of men 
among chairpersons   Std.err 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 2% 
A11 Mean 91% 91% 90% 91% 91% 91% Percentage of women 
among the CEOs  Std.err 1% 1% 1% 2% 1% 2% 
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Significant differences 
• Number of external board memberships. There are significant 
differences among the perceived definition and the family in 
leadership definition. The number of external board member-
ships is highest under the perceived definition. 
• Chairpersons’ age. There is a significant difference between on 
one side the perceived definition, voting control definition, 
majority in ownership, family in board definition and family in 
leadership definition, and on the other side the generation 
definition. It is highest under the generation definition. 
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4. Board composition and attributes of board 
members 
 
Board composition and various measures of board demographics are 
the usual input measure in studies of board effectiveness. “Usual 
suspects” in such studies are often the number of board members, CEO 
duality, insider/outsider ratio and the share ownership of the board 
members. Studies of board members also make distinctions among 
board composition, and board member competence, characteristics and 
compensations. Board composition is about the board as a group, while 
the other are attributes relating the individual board members. 
Important aspects of composition are number of members and 
diversity, including how the board members have knowledge and skills 
that complements or supplements each others knowledge, or the 
knowledge and skills of the CEO and the firm. 
 
4.1 Number of board members: women and employee elected 
directors 
“A board should have an uneven number of members and three are too 
many” (Vance 1983:31). Studies of boards and recommendation in 
codes often conclude that the number of board members generally is 
too high. The arguments are that it is difficult to lead and use properly 
the competence of a large number of board members. With a large 
number of board members it may be difficult for the board to control 
or monitor the CEO. On the other hand the knowledge and skills 
within a board may increase with the number of members. It should be 
noted that 5-8 board members often is considered to be ideal. The 
situation in Norway with women and employee directors is presented 
earlier in section 2.2 about the sample. 
 
Number increases with firm size 
There are differences between family firms and other firms with 
respect to the number of board members, the number of women 
directors and employee elected directors. All numbers are increasing 
with firm size. These figures are presented in table 6. 
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Table 6 Board composition - a comparison across firm sizes 
 
 
Number of board members. The table shows that family firms have 
fewer board members than non-family firms. The number of board 
members increases with the size of the firm.  
 
Women board members. The smallest family firms have the relatively 
largest number of women as board members. In the non-family firm 
boards the number of women as board members increase with the size 
of the firm. In average there are 10% women in the boards in the 
family firms with more than 200 employees. In family firms with less 
than 10 employees there are 22% women. Similar figures for other 
firms are 14% and 16%. In family firms the number of women board 
members does not increase with board size. 
 
Employee elected board members The number of board members 
elected by the employees increases with the size of the firm. This is the 
case for both family and non-family firms. The numbers of board 
members elected by the employees are higher in the larger firms, both 
family and non-family. However, employees in family firms only in 
few cases require the rights to be represented on boards. 
 
Generations and board size 
In table 7 we see that the generation definition is related to higher 
number of board members and the higher number of women directors. 
 
Number of 
employees 
  0-10 11-29 30-49 50-
199 
200- 
Family 153 112 37 52 26 Min N 
Other 155 169 42 86 86 
Family 2.99 3.26 3.57 4.75 6.03 Total number of board 
members 
C1a 
Other 3.63 4.40 4.95 5.72 7.06 
Family 0.67 0.53 0.39 0.61 0.65 Total number of 
women board members  
C1b 
Other 0.58 0.50 0.73 0.81 0.98 
Family 0.09 0.15 0.21 0.63 1.34 Number of employee 
elected board members 
C1c 
Other 0.12 0.31 0.47 1.04 1.87 
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Table 7 Board composition - a comparison across family business definitions 
   Perceived 
V
oting 
control 
M
ajority 
ow
nership 
Fam
ily in 
board 
Fam
ily in 
leadership 
G
eneration 
Definitions   B04 B05 B06 B07 B08 B09 
C1a Mean 3.57 3.63 3.66 3.70 3.52 3.84 Total number of 
board members 
 
 Std.err .08 .08 .08 .07 .07 .11 
C1b Mean 0.59 0.56 0.54 0.53 0.52 0.69 Total number of 
women board 
members  
 Std.err .04 .04 .04 .03 .03 .06 
C1c Mean 0.28 0.28 0.29 0.30 0.24 0.26 Number of 
employee elected 
board members 
 Std.err .04 .03 .03 .03 .03 .05 
 
Significant differences  
• Number of board members. There is a significant difference 
between the perceived definition, voting control definition and 
family in leadership definition on one side, and the generation 
definition on the other. The total number of board members is 
highest under the generation definition.  
• Number of women directors. There is a significant difference 
between on one side the voting control definition, majority in 
ownership definition, family in board definition and family in 
leadership definition, and the generation definition on the 
other. The number of women directors is highest under the 
generation definition. 
 
 
4.2 Knowledge, independence, diversity and motivation 
Board members may have different kinds of knowledge that is relevant 
to the firm, for example about the activities of key business functions 
of the firm, critical technologies and key competencies of the firm, key 
weaknesses in the organization, the development of the firms 
technological environment, issues about health, environment and 
safety and about the needs of the customers. 
 
Much of the discussion in the corporate governance literature is about 
the independence of the board members. The board members should be 
independent of the CEO. This independence is often measured with the 
insider/outsider ratio. This means that the board members should not 
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be employees of the firm, or at least not be part of the executive 
leadership. Independence is also influenced by family ties to the CEO, 
friendship ties to the CEO and business ties to the firm. In some 
countries and in some literature it is also advised that the board 
members should be independent of major owners. 
 
The ongoing discussion about diversity relates to a large degree to the 
question of women directors. However, diversity in the boardroom is 
so much more than gender diversity. Diversity may for example relate 
to the board members functional backgrounds, industry background, 
educational background, personality and age.  
 
There may be different motivations for persons to “sit” in a board and 
to “work” in a board. A main challenge in research about boards of 
directors has been to find out what motivates, or which are the 
incentives that motivate board members to do a good job as board 
members. Codes of best practices recommend that board members 
should own shares in the firm, and that ownership is the most 
important incentive. Researchers have also found that awareness of 
legal liabilities motivates board members to be active and committed. 
Another source of motivation is the market for board members. Board 
participation may be a key to this important marketplace. Those doing 
a good job as a board member are expected to increase their possibility 
to become board members in other firms and even of getting 
interesting and important positions in other firms. Board members 
being “hungry” and aware of following high professional standards 
should thus be attractive.  
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Table 8 Attributes of board members - a comparison across firm sizes 
Number of 
employees 
  0-10 11-29 30-49 50-199 200- 
 Min N Family 113 94 34 49 24 
  Other 143 160 39 84 82 
C4 Family 4.08 3.98 4.10 3.97 3.78 Relevant knowledge 
and competence  Other 4.04 4.01 3.82 3.62 3.67 
C5a Family 3.63 2.94 2.57 2.42 1.96 Family ties to the 
CEO  Other 1.65 1.35 1.19 1.14 1.04 
C5b Family 3.09 2.78 2.94 1.94 2.30 Friendship ties to 
the CEO  Other 2.75 2.17 1.82 1.64 1.51 
C5c Family 3.33 3.11 2.82 2.42 2.69 Business ties to the 
firm  Other 3.41 3.16 2.22 2.44 2.12 
C5d Family 2.26 2.13 2.17 1.98 1.84 Ties to major 
owners  Other 2.03 2.40 2.07 2.40 2.13 
C7 Family 3.48 3.54 3.40 3.72 3.44 Diversity  
 Other 3.33 3.52 3.48 3.40 3.64 
C8a Family 4.28 3.82 4.07 3.68 3.16 Motivation by 
personal ownership  Other 4.01 3.58 3.30 2.84 2.67 
C8b Family 3.50 3.34 3.52 3.37 2.76 Motivation by legal 
standards  Other 3.33 3.37 3.17 3.00 3.22 
C8c Family 3.95 3.92 4.05 4.21 4.12 Motivation by 
professional 
standards 
 Other 3.94 3.95 4.11 3.75 4.23 
 
Less independence in family firms 
In table 8 we see that in family firm that the board members ties with 
the CEO and the firms decrease with firm size. Motivation by personal 
ownership and legal motivation are decreasing. 
 
Relevant knowledge and competence. The table shows that the 
evaluated existence of relevant knowledge and competence decreases 
with firm size. This is the case both in family firms and other firms. 
 
Family ties to the CEO. There exist stronger family ties to the CEO in 
the board of family firms than in the non-family firms. In both family 
and non-family firms, the strength of the family ties decreases with the 
size of the firm.   
 
Friendship ties with the CEO. The friendship ties with CEO in family 
and non-family firms are stronger the smaller the firm is. This 
indicates that in large firms friendship with CEO is not as common as 
in smaller firms. The boards in family firm in size 50-199 differ 
slightly from the other groups.  
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Business ties to the firm. The board members’ business ties to the firm 
decrease with size in family firms. The non-family firm has the same 
pattern except for size 50-199.  
 
Ties to major owners. In family firms the ties of the board members to 
major owners decrease with firm size. There may be an opposite 
tendency in other firms.  
 
Diversity. Diversity is not only related to gender. We have here 
measured diversity in functional background, industry background, 
educational background and age. No differences are found across firm 
sizes or between family firms and other firms.  
 
Motivation by personal ownership. Motivation by personal ownership 
is higher in family firms than in other firms. In family firms motivation 
by personal ownership decreases with firm size. This is also the case in 
other firms.  
 
Motivation by legal standards.  In general there are no big differences 
between family firms and other firms with respect to the board 
members’ motivation by legal standards. The variation across firm 
sizes is not clear, but the figures show that in family firms the 
motivation by legal standards is lowest in the largest firms. 
 
Motivation by professional standards. The board members’ motivation 
by professional standards seems to increase with size. No differences 
between family firms and other firms are found. 
 
Family in leadership versus other definitions 
Table 9 displays a complex picture with respect to definitions and 
knowledge, ties and motivation. The family in leadership definition is 
on various questions different from the other definitions. 
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Table 9 Attributes of board members -  a comparison across family business 
definitions 
 
Significant differences 
• Knowledge and competence. There is a significant difference 
between on one side the perceived definition, voting control 
definition and the majority ownership definition, and on the 
other side the family in the board and family in leadership 
definitions. Knowledge and competence are reported highest 
under the family run definitions (the board and leadership 
definitions).  
• Family ties. There is a significant difference between on one 
side the voting control definition, majority ownership and on 
family in board definition, and the generation definition on the 
other side. The strongest family ties are reported under the 
generation definition. 
• Friendship ties to the CEO. There is a significant difference 
between on one side the perceived definitions, majority in 
ownership and family in board definition, and on the other side 
the family in leadership definition.  There is also a significant 
   Perceived 
V
oting 
control 
M
ajority 
ow
nership 
Fam
ily in 
board 
Fam
ily in 
leadership 
G
eneration 
Definitions   B04 B05 B06 B07 B08 B09 
C4 Mean 4.02 4.03 4.03 4.12 4.12 4.06 Relevant knowledge and 
competence  Std.err .03 .03 .03 .03 .03 .04 
C5a Mean 3.04 2.83 2.66 2.61 2.96 3.18 Family ties to the CEO 
  Std.err .10 .09 .09 .08 .09 .13 
C5b Mean 2.74 2.80 2.72 2.68 2.92 2.91 Friendship ties to the 
CEO  Std.err .09 .08 .08 .07 .08 .12 
C5c Mean 3.01 3.13 3.10 3.11 3.13 3.11 Business ties to the firm 
 Std.err .09 .09 .08 .07 .09 .13 
C5d Mean 2.14 2.25 2.22 2.23 2.14 2.26 Ties to major owners 
 Std.err .09 .08 .08 .07 .08 .12 
C7 Mean 3.52 3.49 3.49 3.51 3.55 3.63 Diversity 
 Std.err .04 .04 .04 .03 .04 .05 
C8a Mean 3.97 4.03 3.93 4.10 4.18 4.25 Motivation by personal 
ownership  Std.err .07 .07 .06 .05 .06 .08 
C8b Mean 3.39 3.35 3.31 3.36 3.48 3.46 Motivation by legal 
standards  Std.err .07 .07 .06 .05 .06 .09 
C8c Mean 4.00 3.99 3.99 3.99 4.07 4.07 Motivation by 
professional standards  Std.err .05 .05 .05 .04 .04 .06 
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difference between the family in board definition and the 
generation definition. Friendship ties are strongest under the 
generation and family in leadership definitions. 
• Diversity. There is a significant difference between on one side 
the perceived definition, voting control definition, majority 
ownership definition and family in leadership definition, and 
on the other side the generation definition. Diversity is highest 
under the generation definition. 
• Motivation by personal ownership. There is a significant 
difference between on one side the perceived definition, voting 
control definition, majority ownership definition and family in 
firm definition, and on the other side the generation definition. 
Motivation by personal ownership is highest under the 
generation definition.  
• Motivation by legal standards. There is a significant difference 
between on one side the majority in ownership definition and 
family in board definition, and on the other side the family in 
leadership definition. Motivation by legal standards is highest 
in the family in leadership definition. 
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5. Interactions inside and outside the boardroom 
 
Corporate governance may be defined as the interaction among 
coalitions of internal actors, external actors and board members in 
directing a corporation to value creation. It is about who and what 
really matters. Who are influencing and making the most important 
decisions in a firm? The CEO and the top management team are 
usually considered to be the most important internal actors, while the 
owners are considered to be the most important external actors.  
 
In family firms we often consider the owners to be internal, while 
managers may be external. Persons being family members are insiders 
in relation to the family, but persons not being family members are 
often considered as outsiders even in cases they are members of the top 
management team. 
 
Interactions inside and outside the boardroom are highly influenced by 
various kinds of trust and emotion, and the quality of board leadership. 
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Table 10 Interactions inside and outside the board - a comparison across firm 
sizes 
Number of employees   0-10 11-29 30-49 50-199 200- 
 Min 
N* 
Family 39/129 35/99 33/35 46/49 23/23 
  Other 28/150 52/164 83/85 83/85 84/85 
D1a Family 1.79 1.69 1.72 1.52 1.83 External actors influence 
the board members in 
their decision-making 
 Other 1.70 1.97 2.15 2.13 1.92 
D1b Family 3.38 3.16 3.32 2.92 3.47 Internal actors influence 
board members in their 
decision-making 
 Other 3.26 3.34 3.50 3.32 3.26 
D1c Family 2.51 1.93 2.29 2.08 2.54 The chair tries between 
the meetings to influence 
other board members 
 Other 2.42 2.52 2.55 2.58 2.40 
D1d Family 3.36 2.94 3.30 3.07 3.20 Some board members 
discuss board decisions 
outside the boardroom 
 Other 3.18 3.33 3.17 3.15 2.91 
D2 Family 2.65 2.29 2.43 2.04 1.70 Role integration. No clear 
division of work between 
chair and CEO  
 Other 2.37 2.03 1.78 1.69 1.53 
D3 Family 4.41 4.25 4.21 4.39 4.29 CEO openly informs the 
board  
 
 Other 4.53 4.23 4.53 4.34 4.50 
D4 Family 4.19 4.23 3.94 4.22 4.01 Degree of relational 
norms between the CEO 
and the chair 
 Other 4.24 4.07 4.17 4.01 4.03 
D5 Family 4.08 4.03 3.93 3.93 3.65 The board is trusting the 
CEO 
 
 Other 4.00 3.95 3.48 3.84 3.81 
D11abc Family 3.54 3.42 3.58 3.84 3.34 Quality of board 
leadership 
 
 Other 3.72 3.66 3.85 3.49 3.71 
D11d Family 3.48 3.40 3.29 3.06 3.37 The chairperson is 
skilled in influencing 
board decision-making 
 Other 3.32 3.22 3.37 3.45 3.29 
*Before the slash D1d, after the slash the rest of the sample 
 
Role integration in family businesses 
The interactions inside and outside the boardroom are presented in 
table 10. A main feature from the table is that role integration is higher 
in family firms than in other firms. Few other differences are found 
across firm sizes, and between family firms and other firms. 
 
The influence of external and internal actors. It is reported that outside 
actors in general do not try to influence the board members in their 
decision-making. Internal actors make some more efforts to influence 
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the board members’ decision-making. There are no differences across 
firm sizes or between family firms and other firms. 
 
Board chair and board members - interactions. No differences are 
found across firm sizes and between family firms and other firms with 
respect to interactions among board members, and between the chair 
and the other board members. 
 
Role integration. There is more role integration in family firms than in 
other firms. Role integration also decreases with firm size. 
 
CEO openly informs the board. No differences are found. 
 
Relational norms. No significant differences are found. 
 
The board trusts the CEO. It is indicated that the boards have more 
trust in the CEO in family firms than in other firms. 
 
Quality of board leadership. This is indicated slightly lower in family 
firms than other firms. No differences across firm sizes. 
 
Chairpersons’ skills. No significant differences are found.  
 
Few differences across definitions 
It is revealed in table 11 that regarding interactions inside and outside 
the boardroom there are few significant differences across family 
business definitions.  
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Table 11 Interactions inside and outside the board - a comparison across 
family business definitions 
   Perceived 
V
oting 
control 
M
ajority 
ow
nership 
Fam
ily in 
board 
Fam
ily in 
leadership 
G
eneration 
Definitions   B04 B05 B06 B07 B08 B09 
D1a Mean 1.72 1.73 1.74 1.74 1.67 1.79 External actors influence 
the board members in 
their decision-making 
 Std.err .06 .06 .05 .05 .05 .08 
D1b Mean 3.25 3.29 3.23 3.30 3.30 3.31 Internal actors try to 
influence board members 
in their decision-making 
 Std.err .07 .07 .06 .06 .07 .10 
D1c Mean 2.26 2.30 2.31 2.32 2.29 2.37 The chair tries between 
the meetings to influence 
other board members 
 Std.err .07 .07 .06 .05 .06 .09 
D1d Mean 3.17 3.23 3.20 2.23 2.23 3.26 Some board members 
discuss board decision 
outside the boardroom 
 Std.err .07 .06 .06 .05 .06 .09 
D2 Mean 2.38 2.45 2.39 2.39 2.50 2.48 Role integration. No clear 
division of work between 
chair and CEO  
 Std.err .08 .08 .07 .07 .07 .11 
D3 Mean 4.32 4.31 4.35 4.32 4.35 4.36 CEO openly informs the 
board  
 
 Std.err .06 .06 .05 .05 .06 .08 
D4 Mean 4.17 4.20 4.17 4.16 4.22 4.21 Degree of relational 
norms between the CEO 
and the chair 
 Std.err .04 .04 .03 .03 .03 .05 
D5 Mean 4.00 4.00 3.98 4.01 4.07 4.01 The board is trusting the 
CEO 
 
 Std.err .03 .03 .03 .03 .03 .05 
D11abc Mean 3.55 3.58 3.58 3.59 3.66 3.61 Quality of board 
leadership 
 
 Std.err .05 .05 .05 .04 .04 .07 
D11d Mean 3.37 3.39 3.40 3.40 3.37 3.50 The chairperson is 
skilled in influencing 
board decision-making 
 Std.err .06 .05 .05 .04 .05 .08 
Significant differences 
• Board trusts the CEO. There exists a significant difference 
between on the one side the perceived definition, voting 
control definition and majority in ownership definition, and the 
family in leadership definition. The trust is highest under the 
family in leadership definition. 
• Quality of board leadership. There exists a significant 
difference among the perceived definition and the family in 
leadership definition concerning the quality of board leader-
ship. It is highest under the family in leadership definition. 
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6. The board’s working style 
 
For boards to do a good job it is not enough to have good board 
members. The board must also have a good working style. One side of 
the board’s working style is the number and length of the board 
meetings. Another side is related to board structures and processes. 
 
6.1 Board meetings 
Board meetings shall normally take place through physical presence. It 
is, however, possible for boards to make decisions without formal 
presence. The length and number of board meetings differ among 
companies. Generally there is a recommendation that board meetings 
should not be long lasting but for a two-days strategy meeting once a 
year. The Norwegian ASA-firms have, from the Norwegian company 
laws, higher pressure to have more meetings than the AS-firms.  
 
The number and length of board meetings are displayed in table 12. It 
is displayed in the table that there are shorter and fewer meetings in 
family firms than in other firms. In table 13 it is displayed that there 
are no significant differences across family business definitions. 
 
Table 12 Board meetings - a comparison across firm sizes 
Number of employees   0-10 11-29 30-49 50-199 200- 
Min N Family 147 109 37 49 24 
  Other 155 170 40 86 84 
D12 Family 2.25 3.00 2.95 3.63 3.87 Length of ordinary board 
meetings (hours)   Other 2.55 3.10 3.36 3.60 4.10 
D13 Family 4.44 4.28 5.37 6.18 6.00 Number of ordinary 
board meetings in 2002  Other 4.44 5.66 6.32 6.24 7.51 
 
Length of board meetings. The length of the board meetings increases 
with the size of the firm. The non-family firm boards have slightly 
longer meetings.  
 
Number of board meetings. Non-family firms have more board 
meetings than family firms. The number of meetings increases with the 
size of the firm.  
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Table 13 Board meetings - a comparison across family business definitions 
   
Perceived 
V
oting 
control 
M
ajority 
ow
nership 
Fam
ily in 
board 
Fam
ily in 
leadership 
G
eneration 
Definitions   B04 B05 B06 B07 B08 B09 
D12 Mean 2.84 2.83 2.84 2.91 2.79 2.97 Length of ordinary 
board meetings (hours)   Std.err .08 .08 .08 .07 .08 .12 
D13 Mean 4.59 4.61 4.61 4.76 4.65 4.64 Number of ordinary 
board meetings   Std.err .11 .11 .10 .09 .11 .16 
 
 
6.2 Structures and processes 
Board structures and processes include the decision-making culture in 
the board. Aspects of this culture are commitment, cohesiveness, 
cognitive conflicts, critical questioning and creativity.   
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Table 14 Board structure and decision-making - a comparison across firm 
sizes 
Number of 
employees 
  0-10 11-29 30-49 50-
199 
200- 
 Min N Family 40 35 31 44 24 
  Other 27 49 33 75 84 
D16 Family 2.35 2.65 2.82 3.09 2.79 Formal board 
instructions are 
followed 
 
 Other 2.32 2.45 2.78 3.03 3.81 
D17 Family 2.86 2.67 2.88 3.00 1.91 A clear division of 
labor among the 
board members 
exists 
 Other 2.41 2.59 2.48 2.31 2.48 
D18 Family 4.06 4.14 4.19 4.14 3.91 Board member 
involvement during 
the meetings 
 
 Other 4.07 4.16 4.12 3.82 3.93 
D19 Family 3.94 3.91 3.95 4.24 4.00 Use of knowledge 
and skills 
 
 
 Other 3.87 3.87 3.82 3.71 3.99 
D25 Family 3.20 2.83 2.86 2.89 2.86 Board members are 
asking discerning 
questions 
 
 Other 2.97 2.90 2.67 2.49 2.52 
D26/27 Family 3.43 3.16 3.25 3.41 3.68 Board members are 
asking discerning 
questions to CEO 
suggestions 
 
 Other 3.19 3.35 3.23 3.24 3.57 
D28/29 Family 3.34 3.07 3.23 3.31 2.87 Board member 
creativity 
 
 
 Other 3.03 3.39 3.28 2.97 2.98 
D38a Family 4.02 3.94 3.81 3.65 3.66 Board members 
having the most 
knowledge are the 
most influential 
 Other 3.88 3.64 3.81 3.79 3.85 
D38b Family 3.71 3.17 3.46 3.31 3.04 Board members 
representing owners 
are the most 
influential 
 Other 3.44 3.12 2.93 3.14 3.16 
 
Differences in board structures and decision-making processes across 
firm size, and between family firms and other firms are reported in 
table 14. In the largest firms formal board instructions are less 
important in family firms than in other firms. 
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Formal board instructions. The larger firms follow board instructions 
more thoroughly than the smaller ones. In firms with more than 200 
employees, board instructions are followed less in family firms than in 
other firms. 
 
Labor division. The division of labor among the board members is 
highest in the smallest and the largest firms. In the largest firms there 
is more division of labor in the non-family firms than in the family 
firms. In the smallest firms the division of labor is highest in the family 
firms.  
 
Board members involvement. No significant differences are found.  
 
Use of knowledge and skills. No significant differences are found. 
 
Board members ask discerning questions. It is indicated that board 
members in family firms are asking more discerning questions inside 
and outside the boardroom than board members in other firms. 
 
Board members ask discerning questions to the CEO. No significant 
differences are found. 
 
The influence of board members with the most knowledge. Few 
differences are found. Board members with the most knowledge seem 
to have less influence in the largest family firms than in the smallest 
family firms.  
 
The influence of board members representing owners. Board members 
in the smallest firms representing owner are more influential in family 
firms than in other firms. 
 
Table 15 shows how board structures and decision-making processes 
vary across family business definitions. No significant differences are 
found. 
 
 
44
Table 15 Board structure and decision-making - a comparison across family 
business definitions 
   Perceived 
V
oting 
control 
M
ajority 
ow
nership 
Fam
ily in 
board 
Fam
ily in 
leadership 
G
eneration 
Definitions   B04 B05 B06 B07 B08 B09 
D16 Mean 2.62 2.59 2.54 2.58 2.63 2.65 Formal board instructions 
are followed  Std.err .07 .07 .06 .06 .06 .09 
D17 Mean 2.76 2.71 2.67 2.70 2.73 2.79 A clear division of labor 
among the board members 
exists 
 Std.err .07 .07 .07 .06 .07 .10 
D18 Mean 4.10 4.13 4.11 4.11 4.14 4.05 Board member involvement 
during the meetings  Std.err .05 .05 .05 .04 .04 .07 
D19 Mean 3.98 3.99 3.96 3.96 3.99 4.01 Use of knowledge and skills 
 Std.err .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .06 
D25 Mean 3.00 2.99 2.92 2.93 2.95 3.01 Board members are asking 
discerning questions outside 
the boardroom 
 Std.err .06 .06 .06 .05 .06 .09 
D26/27 Mean 3.34 3.27 3.30 3.27 3.25 3.33 Board members ask 
discerning questions to 
CEO suggestions 
 Std.err .06 .05 .05 .05 .05 .08 
D28/29 Mean 3.21 3.20 3.18 3.22 3.25 3.29 Board member creativity 
 
 
 Std.err .07 .07 .06 .05 .06 .09 
D38a Mean 3.80 3.83 3.82 3.79 3.80 3.90 Board members having 
the most knowledge are 
the most influential 
 Std.err .07 .07 .06 .06 .07 .09 
D38b Mean 3.37 3.47 3.37 3.36 3.28 3.33 Members representing 
the largest owners have 
the greatest influence 
 Std.err .10 .09 .09 .08 .10 .13 
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7. Board task performance  
 
There may be several ways of listing board tasks. One common way is 
to distinguish between control tasks which are done on behalf of 
external stakeholders or actors, and service tasks on behalf of internal 
actors. Board tasks may also be divided depending on the direction of 
focus of the board members. The board members may have their 
attention directed outside the firm, inside the firm or towards the future 
of the firm. The last group will be related to strategic decision making. 
Combining the two perspectives (control and service) with the three 
directions of the attention, we may find six main board tasks. These are 
output control, behavioral control, strategic control, networking/ 
legitimacy, advice and strategic management. Across these groups 
there may be some legal roles as for example supervising the firm 
resources, remunerating the CEO and protecting minority shareholders.  
 
7.1 Overall tasks - supervising, remunerating and protecting 
General supervisory roles may include overseeing that firm activities 
are properly organized, establishing plans and budgets for the firm’s 
activities, establishing guidelines for the activities, being informed 
about the firm’s financial position, and overseeing that the firm’s 
activities are properly controlled. 
 
A comparison of overall tasks across firm sizes, and between family 
firms and other firms is found in table 16. Only few significant 
differences are found. The main difference is the involvement in 
deciding CEO remuneration.  Boards in family firms are less involved 
in deciding CEO remuneration than in other firms. This difference is 
not found in the smallest firms. 
 
Table 16 Overall tasks - a comparison across firm sizes 
Number of 
employees 
  0-10 11-29 30-49 50-199 200- 
 Min N Family 144 108 37 50 24 
  Other 154 170 41 85 85 
E7abcde Family 4.05 3.99 4.07 4.05 4.20 General supervisory 
tasks 
 
 Other 4.06 4.07 4.06 3.95 4.29 
E8 Family 3.89 3.38 3.72 3.66 4.00 Board involvement 
in deciding CEO 
remuneration 
 Other 3.83 4.20 4.23 4.25 4.47 
E9 Family 4.26 4.39 4.54 4.58 4.37 Protecting minority 
shareholders 
 
 Other 4.16 4.29 .4.47 4.38 4.35 
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A comparison across various family business definitions on the overall 
board tasks is presented in table 17. No significant differences are 
found. 
 
Table 17 Overall tasks - a comparison across family business definitions 
   Perceived 
V
oting 
control 
M
ajority 
ow
nership 
Fam
ily in 
board 
Fam
ily in 
leadership 
G
eneration 
Definitions   B04 B05 B06 B07 B08 B09 
E7abcde Mean 4.06 4.03 4.06 4.05 4.09 4.08 General supervisory 
tasks 
 
 Std.err .04 .04 .04 .03 .04 .06 
E8 Mean 3.70 3.70 3.76 3.78 3.67 3.68 Board involvement 
in deciding CEO 
remuneration 
 Std.err .07 .07 .07 .06 .07 .10 
E9 Mean 4.37 4.37 4.36 4.31 4.39 4.41 Protecting minority 
shareholders 
 
 Std.err .06 .06 .05 .05 .05 .08 
 
 
7.2 Service and control 
Externally focused service tasks are networking and lobbying, 
including reputation building and legitimacy. Internally focused 
service tasks are the direct advisory tasks of the board and the board 
members. Board members may for example have advisory tasks in 
relation to general management questions, legal issues, financial 
issues, technical issues and market issues. The advisory tasks of boards 
are expected to be particularly important in small firms and in family 
firms. Internally focused control tasks may include the quantitative 
follow up of budgets and plans, including investments, sales, costs, 
investments, etc. It may include more qualitative evaluation of the 
CEO, products and human resources. The follow up and decisions 
about financial return to shareholders, and corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) considerations are externally focused control 
tasks. Family firms have a reputation for a stronger CSR orientation 
than other firms. 
 
A comparison of the various service and control tasks across firm 
sizes, and between family firms and other firms is found in table 18. 
The main difference is about the control and evaluation of the CEO, 
products and human resources. Boards in family firms are to a higher 
degree involved in these activities than in other firms. 
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A comparison of the service and control tasks across family business 
definitions is found in table 19. Only one significant difference is 
indicated. This is about the control and evaluation of the CEO, 
products, human resources, etc. The figures for the generation 
definition and the family in leadership definition are higher than for the 
family in board definition. 
 
Table 18 Service and control- a comparison across firm sizes 
 
Networking and lobbying. No big differences are found. It is, however, 
indicated that the boards in the largest non-family firms are more 
involved in lobbying activities than the boards in the largest family 
firms. 
 
Advisory tasks. No notable differences are found. 
 
Internally focused control tasks. The internally focused control tasks 
are control related to past performance and control and evaluation of 
the CEO, etc. Boards in family businesses seem to be more involved in 
Number of employees   0-10 11-29 30-49 50-199 200- 
 Min N Family 140 103 35 48 24 
  Other 143 40 37 50 82 
E1 Family 3.30 3.19 3.32 3.30 3.04 Networking 
 
 
 Other 3.33 3.32 3.21 3.15 3.27 
E2 Family 2.74 2.51 2.62 2.62 2.45 Lobbying 
 
 
 Other 2.73 2.80 2.53 2.80 2.80 
E3 Family 3.42 3.31 3.46 3.52 3.08 Advisory tasks 
 
 
 Other 3.33 3.38 3.18 2.98 3.23 
E4abcd Family 3.99 4.05 4.10 4.06 4.27 Control based on 
measures of past 
performance 
 Other 3.99 4.12 4.17 3.83 4.03 
E4efg Family 3.62 3.24 3.42 3.41 3.57 Control and evaluation 
of the CEO, products, 
human resources 
 Other 3.47 3.35 3.05 2.93 3.14 
E4j Family 4.02 3.71 4.00 3.88 3.70 Financial return to 
shareholders 
 
 Other 3.93 3.94 3.89 3.53 4.05 
E4k Family 3.37 3.21 3.32 3.32 2.87 CSR considerations 
 Other 3.10 3.19 3.29 3.05 3.30 
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control and evaluation of the CEO, products and human resources than 
the boards in other firms. 
 
Externally oriented control tasks. Externally oriented control tasks are 
relating to financial return and CSR considerations. Only a few notable 
differences are indicated. Boards in the largest family firms seem to be 
less involved in following up financial return to shareholders than the 
boards in other firms. They are also less involved than in the smallest 
family firms. In the largest family firms the boards are reported to be 
less involved in CSR considerations than in other firms. A similar 
tendency is indicated about financial return to shareholders. 
 
Table 19 Service and control - a comparison across family business 
definitions 
   Perceived 
V
oting 
control 
M
ajority 
ow
nership 
Fam
ily in 
board 
Fam
ily in 
leadership 
G
eneration 
Definitions   B04 B05 B06 B07 B08 B09 
E1 Mean 3.25 3.32 3.31 3.30 3.31 3.31 Networking 
 
 
 Std.err .06 .06 .06 .05 .06 .08 
E2 Mean 2.63 2.69 2.64 2.67 2.67 2.59 Lobbying 
 
 
 Std.err .07 .06 .06 .05 .06 .09 
E3 Mean 3.39 3.39 3.37 3.37 3.43 3.40 Advisory tasks 
 
 
 Std.err .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .06 
E4abcd Mean 4.06 4.06 4.07 4.06 4.08 4.05 Control based on 
measures of past 
performance 
 Std.err .05 .04 .04 .04 .04 .06 
E4efg Mean 3.43 3.46 3.42 3.41 3.50 3.55 Control and evalua. 
of CEO, products, 
human resources 
 Std.err .05 .05 .05 .04 .05 .07 
E4j Mean 3.89 3.96 3.91 3.93 3.91 4.00 Financial return to 
shareholders 
 
 Std.err .06 .05 .05 .04 .05 .07 
E4k Mean 3.27 3.30 3.26 3.24 3.26 3.34 CSR evaluations 
 
 
 Std.err .06 .06 .05 .05 .05 .08 
 
7.3 The board’s strategic involvement 
There are disputes among corporate governance scholars about the 
boards’ involvement in strategic decision-making. Agency theory, that 
is based on a separation of ownership and management, and on 
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assumptions about managerial opportunism and information 
asymmetry, argues that there should be a separation between decision 
management (including initiation and implementation) and decision 
control (including ratification and evaluation). The boards should be 
involved in decision control, while decision management should be the 
task of the CEO and the management. Other scholars argue that boards 
should have a high involvement in setting the strategic agenda by also 
influencing the content and context of goals and strategies. Scholars 
emphasizing the value creating and not only the value protecting role 
of boards will also argue that strategic decision-making should be done 
as a joint effort between the board and the management.  
 
Table 20 displays the CEOs’ and the boards’ involvement in the 
different phases of the strategic decision-making across firm sizes, and 
between family firms and other firms. Table 21 shows how the 
involvement figures vary across family business definition. Only one 
significant difference is found across family business definitions. That 
is about the CEOs’ involvement in strategy initiation. The family in 
board definition has higher figures than the generation definition. 
 
Strategy initiation. CEOs in family firms are less involved in strategy 
initiation than CEOs in other firms. The CEOs’ involvement in 
strategy initiation increases with firm size. The figures for the boards’ 
involvement in strategy initiation are in all firm categories lower than 
the figures for the CEOs’ involvement. The boards’ involvement in the 
largest non-family firms seems to decrease with firm size. No clear 
tendencies are indicated about the boards’ involvement in family firms. 
 
Strategy ratification. The CEOs’ involvement in strategy ratification 
does not seem to vary across firm sizes, or between family firms or 
other firms. In the largest non-family firms the figures for CEO 
involvement in strategy ratification are lower than for the CEO 
involvement in strategy initiation. There is a tendency that board 
involvement in strategy ratification increases with firm size. The board 
involvement in the largest family firms is lower than in the largest of 
the other firms. There are no significant differences between the 
figures for the CEOs’ and the boards’ involvement in family firms. 
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Table 20 Strategic decision-making - a comparison across firm sizes 
Number of employees   0-10 11-29 30-49 50-199 200- 
 Min N Family 138 107 37 50 24 
  Other 153 169 41 85 85 
E5a Family 3.59 3.76 3.78 4.16 3.95 CEO involvement in 
strategy initiation 
 
 Other 3.85 4.04 4.26 4.40 4.53 
E5b Family 3.77 3.78 3.81 3.90 3.79 CEO involvement in 
strategy ratification 
 
 Other 3.82 3.82 4.07 4.00 3.81 
E5c Family 3.85 3.90 4.16 4.24 4.12 CEO involvement in 
strategy 
implementation 
 Other 3.99 4.08 4.36 4.29 4.54 
E5d Family 3.65 3.66 3.86 4.10 3.95 CEO involvement in 
strategy evaluation and 
control 
 Other 3.72 3.90 4.12 4.01 4.11 
E6a Family 3.17 3.03 3.10 3.38 3.08 Board involvement in 
strategy initiation 
 
 Other 3.10 3.01 2.90 2.95 2.74 
E6b Family 3.65 3.48 3.48 4.00 3.87 Board involvement in 
strategy ratification 
 
 Other 3.74 3.83 3.87 3.92 4.29 
E6c Family 3.36 3.14 3.24 3.34 3.12 Board involvement in 
strategy 
implementation 
 Other 3.37 3.28 3.01 3.05 2.81 
E6d Family 3.47 3.34 3.54 3.74 3.58 Board involvement in 
strategy evaluation and 
control 
 Other 3.54 3.60 3.76 3.56 3.87 
 
The comparisons between the boards’ involvement in strategy 
initiation and strategy ratification show clear differences. Boards are 
more involved in strategy ratification than in initiation. These 
differences are significant in all firm categories. 
 
Strategy implementation. It is indicated in the table that CEO 
involvement in strategy implementation increases with firm size. There 
is also a slight tendency that the CEO involvement is lower in family 
firms than in other firms. CEO involvement in strategy implementation 
is higher than CEO involvement in strategy initiation and ratification. 
This is in particular the case in the largest firms. 
 
There is a tendency that board involvement in strategy implementation 
decreases with firm size. This tendency is the most evident in non-
family firms. The figures for board involvement in strategy 
implementation are significantly lower than the figures for the CEO 
involvement. This is the case for all firm categories. 
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There are only minor differences between the figures for board 
involvement in strategy implementation and the figures for board 
involvement in strategy initiation. The figures for strategy ratification 
are thus higher than for strategy implementation. 
 
Strategy evaluation and control. There is a tendency that the CEOs’ 
involvement in strategy evaluation and control increases with firm 
size. The differences between family firms and other firms are only 
minor. The figures for strategy evaluation and control are generally 
lower than for strategy implementation. For the largest firms they are 
slightly higher than for strategy ratification, and for the largest non-
family firms they are lower than for the strategy initiation figures. 
 
There is a tendency that the boards’ involvement in strategy evaluation 
and control is lower for family firms than for the other firms. There is 
also a minor tendency that this involvement increases with firm size. 
The figures for the boards’ involvement in strategy evaluation and 
control are slightly lower than the figures for the CEOs’ involvement. 
 
The figures for the boards’ involvement in strategy evaluation and 
control are higher than the figures for the boards’ involvement in 
strategy initiation and implementation, but lower than the figures for 
the boards’ involvement in strategy implementation. These tendencies 
are found across all firm categories. 
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Table 21 Strategic decision-making - a comparison across family business 
definitions 
   Perceived 
V
oting 
control 
M
ajority 
ow
nership 
Fam
ily in 
board 
Fam
ily in 
leadership 
G
eneration 
Definitions   B04 B05 B06 B07 B08 B09 
E5a Mean 3.76 3.81 3.82 3.86 3.80 3.73 CEO involvement in 
strategy initiation 
 
 Std.err .06 .05 .05 .04 .05 .08 
E5b Mean 3.80 3.83 3.81 3.83 3.85 3.85 CEO involvement in 
strategy ratification 
 
 Std.err .05 .05 .05 .04 .05 .08 
E5c Mean 3.97 4.04 4.02 4.03 3.98 4.03 CEO involvement in 
strategy 
implementation 
 Std.err .05 .05 .05 04 .05 .07 
E5d Mean 3.75 3.84 3.79 3.79 3.78 3.73 CEO involvement in 
strategy evaluation 
and control 
 Std.err .05 .05 .05 .04 .05 .08 
E6a Mean 3.15 3.18 3.15 3.17 3.22 3.12 Board involvement 
in strategy initiation 
 
 Std.err .07 .06 .06 .05 .06 .09 
E6b Mean 3.65 3.68 3.70 3.72 3.72 3.66 Board involvement 
in strategy 
ratification 
 Std.err .06 .06 .05 .05 .05 .08 
E6c Mean 3.27 3.28 3.28 3.28 3.38 3.29 Board involvement 
in strategy 
implementation 
 Std.err .06 .06 .06 .05 .06 .08 
E6d Mean 3.47 3.52 3.54 3.53 3.58 3.48 Board involvement 
in strategy 
evaluation and 
control 
 Std.err .06 .06 .05 .05 .05 .08 
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8. Summary 
 
The objective of this report has been to present descriptive statistics 
about boards in family firms. Our objective is that the figures shall lead 
to discussions about boards in family firms that will guide us in our 
further analysis. We have presented the result based on three overall 
research questions. These are what characterize boards in family firms 
compared to boards in other firms, how do boards in family firms vary 
with firm size, and finally how does various core family firm 
attributes, as they are incorporated in various family firm definitions, 
impact the understanding of board attributes in family firms. 
 
Our data about boards in family firms are from 985 Norwegian firm 
collected through the “value creating board” surveys. Responses from 
CEOs have been used. The board data has been reported under five 
headings: 
• The CEO and the chairperson (chapter 3) 
• Board composition and attributes of board members (chapter 
4) 
• Interactions inside and outside the boardroom (chapter 5) 
• The board’s working style (chapter 6) 
• Board task performance (chapter 7) 
 
How family firm board descriptions vary with definitions 
In the overall presentations we have used a perceived definition of a 
family firm. A firm is a family firm if the CEO perceives it to be a 
family firm. However, various other definitions could have been used, 
and in our comparisons of family firm definitions we used the 
following definitions: 
• Perceived by the CEO to be a family firm (B04) was reported 
in 396 cases 
• One or a few families have a voting control (B05) was 
reported in 436 cases 
• One or a few families have majority ownership (B06) was 
reported in 463 cases 
• Owner families are represented in the board (B07) was 
reported in 596 cases 
• Owner families are represented in leadership (B08) was 
reported in 473 cases 
• More generations from the owner family active in the firm 
(B09) was reported in 211 cases 
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We found that there were significant differences in the reported figures 
depending on definitions. However, there were few significant 
differences about actual board behavior in chapters 5-7. They were 
mostly related to attributes and descriptions of the CEO and the board 
members, including board composition. We also found that the 
perceived definition (B04) and the voting control definition (B05) had 
few extreme values. In the analyses of family firm definitions we 
found that the generation definition (B09) had the most “extreme” 
values. An extreme value is highest or lowest value reported on each 
row in the tables comparing definitions. An extreme value is not the 
same as a significant difference, but it is a proxy indicating the 
definitions being the most different and those that the most can 
resemble all definitions. The definitions with the most extreme values 
are the most different, and those with fewest which definitions that 
may resemble all definitions the best.  
 
The generation definition (B09) had 39 extreme values, the family in 
leadership definition (B08) had 28 extreme values, the family in board 
definitions (B07) had 19 extreme values, the majority ownership 
definition (B06) and the perceived definition (B04) had both 17 
extreme values, and the voting control definition (B05) had 13 extreme 
values. Overall, the same results were found when weighing the 
different questions with respect to themes. This means that the 
perceived definition may be a good starting point for analyses between 
family firms and other firms. 
 
How family firm boards differ from boards in other firms 
The descriptions have shown that the main differences between family 
firm boards and boards in other firms are about board composition and 
board member characteristic, including attributes of the chairperson 
and the CEO. 
 
In chapter 3 we found the following difference between the boards of 
family firms and other firms. The board chairperson is older in family 
firms, and the age difference between the chairperson and the CEO is 
bigger. In family firms there are more CEO duality (also being the 
chairperson), the CEO is more often a board member, and the 
chairperson is more often the former CEO. The tenure of the 
chairperson in family firms is almost the double of chairpersons in 
other firms. The chairpersons often hold the position almost 20 years. 
The CEO tenure as CEO and in the firm is also longer than in other 
firms. 
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In chapter 4 we found that the number of board members is generally 
lower in family firms than in other firms. There are also fewer board 
members elected by the employees. This is the case both in absolute 
numbers and in relative numbers. There are more women directors in 
family firms than in other firms, but the number of women directors do 
not increase with board size. The ties of the board members to the 
CEO and to the owners are stronger in family firms than in other firms. 
Motivation by personal ownership is stronger in family firms. 
 
The differences reported between the boards in family firms and other 
firms are not so distinct in the rest of the chapters. In chapter 5 about 
interactions we found that role integration and the board members’ 
trust in the CEO were reported to be higher in family firms than in 
other firms. A tendency was also reported that the quality of the board 
chairperson’s leadership was lower in family firms. In chapter 6 we 
found figures showing that in family firms the number of board 
meetings is fewer, and the length of the board meetings is shorter than 
in other firms. However, we also found that the board members are 
asking more discerning questions to the CEO. 
 
Board task performance is described in chapter 7. The boards in family 
firms are less involved in deciding CEO remuneration than in other 
firms, but they are more involved in control and evaluation of the 
CEO, human resources and products. It was also indicated that in 
family firms the CEOs are less involved in strategy initiation, and the 
boards are less involved in strategy control and evaluation. 
 
How family firm boards vary with firm size 
We have also seen how the descriptions of boards in family firms vary 
with firm size. The figures in chapter 3 reveal that CEO duality varies 
with firm size, and CEO board membership decreases with firm size. 
Chairperson and CEO age increase with firm size, so does also the 
number of external board memberships held by the CEO. A few 
women are chairs and CEOs in the smallest firms, but women are 
almost non-existent in the larger firms.  
 
In chapter 4 it was described that the number of board members 
increases with firm size, and so does also the number of employee 
elected directors. The ratio of employee elected directors increases 
with firm size, but the ratio of women directors decreases. We also 
found that the evaluated existence of relevant knowledge and 
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competence decreases with firm size. The strength of ties between the 
CEO and the board members decreases with firm size. This is the case 
for family ties, friendship ties, business ties and ties to owners. 
Furthermore, motivation by personal ownership decreases with firm 
size, but motivation by professional standards increase with firm size. 
 
The questions about interactions in chapter 5 only revealed that role 
integration decreases with firm size. In the chapter about the board 
working style we found that the length and number of board meetings 
increase with firm size. Board instructions are followed more 
thoroughly in larger firms than in the smaller firms. The importance of 
knowledge among individual board members for influencing board 
decision-making seems to be less in the larger than in the smaller 
firms. Board members representing owners are more influential in the 
small family firms than in the large ones. 
 
In chapter 7 we found few significant relations between the size of the 
family firm and board task performance. Boards in the largest family 
firms seem to be less involved in controlling financial return to 
shareholders and CSR considerations than the boards in smaller firms. 
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Appendix: Frequencies 
 
Above we have presented various summaries. In the following 
frequency tables we present some of the detailed responses to the 
various questions in the questionnaires. Percentages are reported from 
firms where the CEO perceives the firm as a family firm (Question 
B04). 
 
Frequency table 1: Number of board members 
 
 
Number of Board 
members 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 N 
C1a  On December 31st 
2002, how many 
board members with 
voting power, 
including the board 
chairperson and 
members elected 
from the employees, 
did the firm have?   
  
9 
 
17 
 
30 
 
20 
 
13 
 
6 
 
3 
 
2 
 
1 
 
395 
C1b 
 
…were women 
total? 
55 33 10 1       395 
C1c 
 
…were elected by 
the employees? 
83 8 7 1 1      392 
Percentages reported. Only family firms 
 
Frequency table 2: Board knowledge 
Percentages reported. Only family firms 
 
 Likert type scale 
 1=strongly disagree 5=strongly agree 
1 2 3 4 5  
C4a 
 
Our board is knowledgeable about: 
the activities of key business functions of the firm 
 1 3 26 70 391 
C4b 
 
…the critical technologies and key competencies 
of the firm 
2 4 15 41 39 389 
C4c 
 
…the key weaknesses in the organization 1 4 24 44 27 388 
C4d 
 
…the developments in the firm’s technological 
environment 
1 8 33 37 20 384 
C4e 
 
…the issue of health. environment and safety 2 7 36 40 15 388 
C4f 
 
…the needs of our customers  2 16 51 31 389 
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Frequency table 3: Independence, diversity and motivation 
 Likert type scale 
 1=strongly disagree 5=strongly agree 
1 2 3 4 5 N 
C5a 
 
Our board members do have family ties 
to the CEO 
42 4 6 6 43 375 
C5b 
 
…friendship ties to the CEO 33 17 17 10 24 334 
C5c 
 
…business ties to the firm 34 8 13 12 33 329 
C5d …ties to firms or persons with major 
ownership in the firm 
58 9 9 8 15 318 
C7a Our board members represent a diversity 
of functional backgrounds (e.g. sales, 
finance, accounting) 
6 8 19 31 37 367 
C7b 
 
…a diversity of industry backgrounds 16 15 26 26 17 350 
C7c …a diversity of educational 
backgrounds (directions - not level) 
8 8 28 27 19 358 
C7d 
 
…a diversity of ages 10 15 30 27 18 356 
C8a The board members are positively 
motivated to do a good job by personal 
ownership interests 
12 3 9 24 51 378 
C8b 
 
…by formal legal responsibilities (for 
example liability) 
12 12 25 29 22 358 
C8c 
 
…by professional standards (for 
example reputation) 
2 4 17 44 33 365 
Percentages reported. Only family firms 
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Frequency table 4: Interactions inside and outside the boardroom 
 Likert type scale 
 1=strongly disagree 5=strongly agree 
1 2 3 4 5 N 
D1a When the board shall make very important 
decisions external stakeholders or actors (e.g. 
groups of owners, investors, business 
relations) try to influence the decision-
making of the board members 
62 16 11 8 3 367 
D1b …internal stakeholders or actors (e.g. the 
CEO or persons from the top management 
team) try to influence the decision-making of 
the board members 
17 11 20 31 20 364  
D1c …chairperson contacts other board members 
before meetings to get support for his/her 
own points of view 
40 17 25 13 6 360 
D1d …some of the board members discuss 
together (formally or informally) board 
issues between or outside the board meetings 
that impact board decision-making 
16 12 27 30 16 366 
D2 There is no clear division of work between 
the board chairperson and the CEO 
45 16 13 9 17 369 
D3 Top management believes in keeping the 
board informed about all aspects of the firm’s 
operations 
1 2 16 29 53 180 
D5a The board is willing to accept the CEO’s 
judgment on strategy formation 
1 3 20 48 28 365 
D5b 
 
…to base their judgment on knowledge and 
insights of the CEO 
1 5 19 50 25 365 
D5c 
 
…to believe that the CEO, if needed, will 
consult the board  
 1 9 44 40 353 
D5d …to mandate the CEO to act as spokesperson 
for the views of the board or the firm 
1 2 12 36 48 358 
D5e 
 
…to accept strategic decisions of the CEO  2 4 18 47 30 353 
D5f …to give the CEO a priory mandate to act 
for the organization in important situations 
15 20 27 24 15 355 
D5g …to mandate the CEO to take strategic 
decisions without prior consulting the board  
15 20 27 24 15 351 
D11a The board chairperson is especially skilled in 
motivating and using the competency of each 
of the board members 
6 11 32 39 13 352 
D11b 
 
…in formulating and summarizing decisions 
from the discussions 
4 10 26 41 21 349 
D11c …in chairing board discussions without 
promoting his/her own agenda or motives 
5 10 27 38 21 349 
D11d 
 
…in getting own decision proposals ratified 
by the board 
5 13 36 32 14 346 
Percentages reported. Only family firms 
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Frequency table 5: Length of board meetings 
Percentages reported. Only family firms 
 
 
Frequency table 6: Number of board meetings 
Percentages reported. Only family firms 
 Number of hours 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 N 
D12 How many hours was an ordinary 
board meeting scheduled for in 2002 
2 14 26 29 18 7 2 369 
 Number of board 
meetings 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 12 N 
D13 How many 
ordinary board-
meetings with a 
physical presence 
were held in 
2002? 
2 4 11 9 29 15 17 5 4 1 2 2 369 
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Frequency table 7: Boards structures and processes 
Percentages reported. Only family firms 
 Likert type scale 
 1=strongly disagree 5=strongly agree 
1 2 3 4 5 N 
D16 The board actively uses the board 
instructions in it’s work 
28 18 27 17 10 368 
D17 There exists a clearly stated division of 
labor among the board members  
24 19 26 16 15 368 
D18 All board members are actively involved 
during the meetings  
4 5 14 32 46 366 
D19a Our board members are fully using their 
knowledge and skills in their board 
involvement 
3 5 16 36 40 367 
D19b …are prioritizing to devote all necessary 
time to their board assignment 
3 7 27 34 30 365 
D19c …are always available if the board work 
should demand it  
1 5 18 34 50 364 
D25 The board is usually active in finding their 
own information in addition to the reports 
from management 
15 16 37 18 14 353 
D26 The board is often asking discerning 
questions in connection with suggestions 
initiated by the management 
7 10 29 37 17 365 
D27 The board often asks critical questions 
regarding information presented by the 
management 
9 15 33 28 15 363 
D28 Our board members present many creative 
and innovative suggestions 
3 19 37 33 8 181 
D29 
 
Our board finds many creative and 
innovative solutions  
4 19 38 30 8 182 
D38a When an issue is discussed, the board 
members with the most experience and 
knowledge of the issue have the greatest 
influence  
3 3 25 44 24 362 
D38b …the board members representing the 
largest owners have the greatest influence 
12 13 24 29 22 362 
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Frequency table 8: Service and control 
 Likert type scale 
 1=strongly disagree 5=strongly agree 
1 2 3 4 5 N 
E! Board members contribute to networking 
that provides contacts with important 
stakeholders 
10 16 29 29 16 362 
E2 … contribute to lobbying and 
legitimizing. e.g. affecting important 
stakeholders  
23 24 27 18 8 360 
E3a 
 
…contribute with advise on general 
management questions 
6 12 26 36 20 365 
E3b 
 
…  …on legal issues 13 19 26 25 18 365 
E3c 
 
…  …on financial issues 6 12 19 37 26 366 
E3d 
 
… …on technical issues 10 21 31 25 13 364 
E3e 
 
… …on market issues 5 12 26 40 17 363 
E4a 
 
The board is involved in following up 
and controlling cost budgets 
3 8 14 36 39 396 
E4b 
 
…controlling sales budgets 5 7 17 36 34 396 
E4c 
 
…controlling firm liquidity 2 3 17 36 42 396 
E4d 
 
…controlling investments 2 3 14 31 50 396 
E4e 
 
…controlling the CEOs contribution and 
behavior 
6 15 26 30 23 396 
E4f 
 
…controlling product quality 8 16 32 24 20 396 
E4g 
 
…controlling human resources 5 13 32 30 21 396 
E4j 
 
…controlling financial return to 
shareholders 
4 6 19 39 32 362 
E4k 
 
…controlling the CSR activity of the firm 6 17 34 29 14 365 
Percentages reported. Only family firms 
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Frequency table 9: Strategic decision-making 
 Likert type scale 
 1=strongly disagree 5=strong agree 
1 2 3 4 5 N 
E5a 
 
The CEO and the management actively 
initiate strategy proposals 
4 9 22 38 28 368 
E5b 
 
…make decisions on long-term strategy 3 8 22 40 27 368 
E5c 
 
…implement strategy decisions 3 4 18 43 32 367 
E5d 
 
…control and evaluate strategy decisions 4 6 25 40 25 368 
E6a 
 
Our board actively initiates strategy 
proposals 
11 19 28 25 16 368 
E6b 
 
…. makes decisions on long-term strategy 6 10 23 36 25 368 
E6c 
 
…. implements strategy decisions 8 16 32 29 15 363 
E6d 
 
…. is active in controlling and evaluating 
strategy decisions  
5 12 29 36 17 363 
Percentages reported. Only family firms 
 
 
 
 
Frequency table 10: Supervising, remunerating and protecting 
 Likert type scale 
 1=strongly disagree 5=strong agree 
1 2 3 4 5 N 
E7a 
 
Our board sees to that the activities are 
properly organized 
2 8 20 40 30 368 
E7b 
 
… establishes plans and budgets for the 
firms’ activities  
4 5 18 39 34 368 
E7c 
 
… board establishes guidelines for the 
activities 
3 5 22 40 31 367 
E7d 
 
… board keeps itself informed about the 
financial position of the firm  
1 1 7 36 56 369 
E7e 
 
… board sees to that the activities are 
properly controlled  
1 4 16 36 42 367 
E8 
 
… board sets the CEO remuneration 13 7 16 25 39 363 
E9 
 
…board never acts in such a manner that it 
provides some shareholders advantages on 
the expense of other shareholders 
7 2 8 14 70 354 
Percentages reported. Only family firms 
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